THE

CRISIS STATED;

OR,

SERIOUS AND SEASONABLE HINTS UPON WAR IN GENERAL,

AND UPON THE

CONSEQUENCES OF A WAR WITH FRANCE.

By Thomas Bigge Esq
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" Is it contrary to the duty of a good citizen to reprobate " ſuch proceedings? Is it inhuman to prevent, if poſſible, the " ſpilling of *Frenchmen*'s blood, or imprudent to guard againſt " the effuſion of *our own?*" BURKE'S APPEAL, p. 9.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

AS the following pages were written and printed off in great haſte, the Author thinks it proper to apologize for many negligences in the compoſition, as well as ſome typographical errors. For the general intention with which they were written, he deems no apology to be neceſſary: His intention was to recommend caution, and thus to preſerve internal as well as external tranquility. This is the ſole object of the quæres which follow; this intention muſt be clear to every candid mind; and by it he is willing to be judged. He is not ſenſible of having tranſgreſſed the bounds which are warranted by a fair conſtruction of the Freedom of the Preſs, or by a filial reverence for the Britiſh Conſtitution. But if any expreſſion can be interpreted, by even a ſtudied ingenuity, into a ſenſe tending to diſturb the *peace* of the community, he ſolemnly declares that ſenſe to be foreign from his meaning: *Pro indicto habeatur:* And he wiſhes it to be underſtood, that he formally diſapproves of whatever is inconſiſtent with the ſtrongeſt attachment to domeſtic peace, to legal ſubordination, and to the free principles of our ſubſiſting Government.

But while he makes this declaration of his ſentiments, he muſt be allowed to mention, that, under ſuch circumſtances as the preſent, it is peculiarly the duty of our Repreſentatives to purſue a diligent examination into the opinions and temper of every deſcription of the people reſpecting a war; and that it is a duty equally binding upon the nation, to ſeek for ſuch proofs, and to ſcrutinize ſuch points, as may hereafter fully enable them to decide, with conſcientious impartiality, upon the conduct of their preſent Repreſentatives.

THE CRISIS STATED.

AS a war with France is a meaſure which the nation is at preſent loudly called upon to approve, and as it is a meaſure of the deepeſt concern to the intereſts of the Engliſh people, one who is a friend to the Conſtitution, to Liberty, and to Peace, is anxious to lay before his fellow-ſubjects a few ſhort hints, which may enable them to form a tolerable judgment concerning the nature and conſequences of ſuch an event.

It is wonderful with what indifference and unconcern, a criſis, ſo ſerious as the preſent, is beheld. But our wonder will be diminiſhed, when we enumerate the mean and deſpicable artifices which governments ever employ to produce this infatuation, and to make war (the curſe of the whole human race) a

ſubject popular to the people. They keep them in profound ignorance of its effects; they inflame their paſſions, flatter their pride, and deceive them by all the empty and diſguſting pageantries which march in the train of military preparations. Armaments, reviews, drums, flags, crowds, and acclamations, are the hacknied ſtage-tricks employed to cover a meaſure which will not bear a cool examination.

But war is neither the innocent, amuſing, nor honourable paſtime, which Miniſters and their adherents often repreſent it to be. It is at no time, and under no circumſtances, a very deſirable meaſure: It is an evil to be endured when unavoidable, rather than coveted when unneceſſary. Religion condemns the practice of war; reaſon forbids it; true policy is averſe to it; and experience declares it to be the ſcourge of mankind. It deſtroys commerce, ſuſpends agriculture, ruins manufactures; and makes the pooreſt man much poorer, by augmenting the taxes, and by rendering every article of his own conſumption, every article he buys for the uſe of his little houſehold, twice as dear as it was before.

Conſidered in a moral view, war will be found to pervert the ſocial affections, to corrupt

rupt the uſeful virtues, to baniſh the idea of juſtice, and to give opportunity to the moſt flagitious and deſtructive propenſities. It inflames anger, ambition, avarice, cruelty, rapine, revenge. War, then, is the greateſt of all evils that can befal a flouriſhing nation. Nor is this the whole: For how are its neceſſary preparations carried on? By violence—injury. The protection of the law is then ſuſpended, and perſonal liberty ſubjected to perpetual violation. Honeſt men are dragged by force from their native homes, from their wives and infant children, from their friends, their property, and peaceful occupations. Thus cruelly torn from thoſe they love and ſupport, they are conſtrained to endure the ſevereſt hardſhips, and to encounter the ſucceſſive calamities of battle, famine, confinement, or diſeaſe. In the mean time, the family of the poor ſufferer, inſtead of being liberally ſupported by the national purſe, is probably abandoned to want and deſpair; and while their father, or brother, or ſon, is complimented with having died in the *bed of honor*, they are driven to the ſtench of a poorhouſe, or left to ſtarve upon the ſcanty penſion of a pariſh allowance.

Theſe are the bleſſed effects of war! The

glorious triumph, " which makes ambition virtue." Such are the conſequences inſeparable from it, when carried on in your enemy's territory: If by any misfortune or miſconduct it be brought into your own country, then theſe evils encreaſe beyond computation.

If wars bring ſuch calamities upon multitudes of poor innocent people, from what cauſe, or for what purpoſes are they commenced? The queſtion is pertinent: hiſtory furniſhes the reply. Moſt princes are there deſcribed as lovers of war, becauſe it makes their ſubjects poor; whatever impoveriſhes the people, ſtrengthens the hands of the executive government. Poverty is the ſource of political dependence, as ignorance is the cauſe of ſpiritual ſubjection. The lower orders of the community have been frequently kept poor and illiterate from this very motive. Princes are ſeldom averſe to war, becauſe, during ſuch a meaſure, their prerogative is encreaſed both in face and extent; and when peace is reſtored, this extraordinary grant of power is uſually by ſome ſtratagem artfully retained. Thoſe who conſider how much war, by multiplying paymaſters, contractors, commiſſaries, and agents, has extended in various directions the influence of the crown,

crown, and that ſtanding armies are an evil reſulting from this ſame infernal ſyſtem, will want few other arguments to prove to them, that peace is not always the beſt policy of corrupt courts.

It has been a common practice with Miniſters to engage their people in a war, whenever they found them becoming diſcontented under oppreſſion, or enquiring a little too freely into their own rights, and the duties of their governors.

As few Miniſters have been found upright or ſpirited enough to ſatisfy theſe diſcontents when modeſtly urged, they have tried to ſilence them by arbitrary means and diſcouraging threats; by garriſons, barracks, and encampments; or by the happier expedient of plunging the nation into a long, bloody, and expenſive war with another nation, whom they inſult for this wiſe and benevolent purpoſe.

It ſometimes happens that a country has made a revolution in its government, and is become free; another country near it, fearing that ſome of its free principles might be infectious, chuſes to prevent this horrible evil, by what is termed a ſeaſonable and politic war. Thus the Empreſs of Ruſſia overturned

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the liberties of Poland, becauſe ſhe thought it dangerous that the honeſt Poles ſhould enjoy the bleſſings of liberty ſo near her dominions. Pruſſia and Auſtria attempted the ſame thing with reſpect to France, and the Duke of Brunſwick marched his confederate ruffians with this avowed purpoſe, and upon the atrocious principle juſt explained; yet ſuch principles as theſe are called wiſe and politic, and held out for our cordial approbation, though we feel and are aſſured that nothing can be politic or wiſe, which is not chriſtian-like and juſt.*— [*See Appendix.*]

Many ſuch principles and events hiſtory records for our advantage; but we ourſelves muſt draw the parallel, and make the application. What leſſon ſhould theſe facts teach us? clearly this: That upon the firſt rumour of a war, we ſhould examine the different motives, from which it may be ſuppoſed to be undertaken, with the moſt inquiſitive jealouſy, and the moſt anxious diſtruſt; and that we ſhould diſregard eloquence or declamation, and call loudly for vouchers and proofs. Confidence before conviction, is, in moſt caſes, folly; in the preſent, it is wickedneſs. Let us ſuſpect the conduct of all who are eagerly perſuading

us,

us, that a war is juſt, honourable, and for our advantage. Let us be cautious how we credit theſe idle declaimers, in oppoſition to the beſt deductions of reaſon, and the unerring inſtincts of our nature.

Twenty years ago, the ſuſpicion I recommend would have prevented the American war, which coſt us upwards of one hundred thouſand lives, and one hundred and forty millions of money; and it would have prevented the indelible diſgrace of our returning defeated, inſulted, and purſued, after having abandoned every object which it was our wiſh to obtain.

The mention of the American war leads me to compare the hopes under which it was commenced, with the encouragements given us by ſome fine ſpeakers, in caſe of a war with France. We were then cajoled by theſe expreſſions:— "O go to war by all means! Tax the colo- "nies, and you will be rich and happy as "long as you live! A handful of men, and "a few frigates, will do the buſineſs. The re- "bels have no army, no navy, no allies, no "funds, no reſources, no national credit, no "military ſtores, no union, no ſubordination. "You have all theſe things in abundance. A "few cowardly, undiſciplined yankies, are no

"match

" match for Great-Britain. You may eaſily " oblige them to pay half your taxes. Is not " then a war politic and expedient? The man " that diſſuades you from war, is an enemy to " his country, a traitor, &c. &c. A war for " ever! Huzza!!!"

This proſpect was too bright, not to dazzle and allure; we ruſhed into war headlong—a ten years mad experience proved every aſſertion to be *directly falſe.*

In that unfortunate conteſt, our troops, for the firſt time, bore arms againſt a nation *contending for liberty.* What was the conſequence? The ſacred ſpirit of *liberty* ſupplied the want of every other reſource, and our troops were, for the firſt time, beaten and diſgraced! Mark this attentively. A people are deſperate in obtaining their freedom, or in defending it when obtained. Thoſe who are deſperate, are for the moſt part invincible. It is madneſs to provoke men under ſuch circumſtances.

What now is the language of thoſe who ſo eagerly recommend a war with France?

" For God's ſake declare war againſt France; " you will be otherwiſe undone. Are you not " told from good authority, that plots, conſpi- " racies, alarms, and inſurrections, prevail

" every

" every where? No man's life, or liberty, or
" property will be ſafe, unleſs you go to war
" with France. Church and ſtate will both
" be reformed, if you do not ſupport this mea-
" ſure. Can you reconcile to your conſciences
" a commutation for tithes, a reduction of pen-
" ſions, an abolition of pluralities, and a more
" free and equal repreſentation of the people?
" Arreſt this ſpirit of liberty and enquiry, be-
" fore ſuch evils befal you. Beſides, now is
" your time to be revenged on your old and
" natural enemy. She is now deſtitute of eve-
" thing neceſſary to war, of money, credit, na-
" vy, and allies. All Europe will join you—
" it is the common cauſe of princes—you muſt
" ſucceed. It will only coſt us a few thouſand
" lives, that may very well be ſpared; and
" ſome additional millions, which we can place
" to the account of our poſterity. It is really
" a pity we ſhould not go to war,—we are ſo
" populous, ſo flouriſhing, ſo rich;—and the
" laſt year's taxes exceed the expenditure.——
" You may not enjoy ſuch a happy opportunity
" of going to war for many years to come.——
" A war for ever!——REVENGE! REVENGE!
" REVENGE!"

A poor man, whoſe enthuſiaſm is a good deal ſubdued by hard labour, by a cold climate, by ſcanty wages, by oppreſſive taxes, and by the neceſſary care of a family, does not immediately enter into the ſanguine feelings which theſe ſounds are meant to excite. By the wickedneſs of ſome of theſe arguments he is ſhocked, and of others he diſtruſts the flattering annunciations, becauſe they have often proved falſe.

Having been taught that war is, in its very principle, irreligious and unnatural, in its progreſs cruel and barbarous, in its events fallacious and uncertain, he betakes himſelf to enquire into the other ſide of the queſtion, and aſks ſome honeſt, ſenſible man of his acquaintance, what chances there are of a war being hazardous and unſucceſsful. This man, if he be really honeſt and ſenſible, will ſay to him thus: — "Friend, you do well to enquire into "the probable conſequences of a war with "France. Poor as you are, whenever that hap- "pens, you muſt pay your ſhare of the expence. "If it be poſſible to avoid a war, it ought to be "avoided. War has been too long the amuſe- "ment of courts, and the deſtruction of man- "kind. Before we enter into one, we ought "to be convinced that every virtuous and pru-

"dent

" dent ſtep has been taken to prevent it. Mi-
" niſters are bound to prove this at large to the
" nation. It is not a ſpeech of declamation, or
" a high-ſounding manifeſto, that you are to
" regard; proofs and arguments muſt be given
" you. Remember this truth. As to the hap-
" py conſequences of a war, I think they are
" very doubtful. I will ſuppoſe two caſes, ei-
" ther or both of which may happen.—*Firſt*,
" that Holland ſhould be over-run by the
" French. We all know that there is a ſtrong
" party of patriots in Holland, ready to take
" advantage of any embarraſſment in a govern-
" ment to which they are diſaffected: We know
" that, five years ago, they actually overthrew
" that government, by their own natural pow-
" ers. Will not this determined band of pa-
" triots receive the French as their deliverers
" from an imperious ariſtocracy? Undoubtedly
" they will. However, ſuppoſe the reverſe.
" Suppoſe the whole Dutch nation was to unite
" to a man in defence of their bogs and ſand-
" banks, their dykes and canals; are they even
" thus an equal match for one of the high-ſpi-
" rited and victorious armies of France? Could
" they ſtand againſt a French army, formed of
" the moſt perſevering troops, led by the moſt

" enterprising generals, and provided with such
" artillery as was never before brought into a
" field of action? The veteran troops of Prussia
" and Germany have fled before it; and I think
" the honor of silencing this tremendous train
" is hardly reserved for our friends the Dutch.
" *Secondly*, I think it a very supposable case,
" that when we are engaged in the middle of a
" French war, the Empress of Russia, whom
" our Ministers have taken no pains to concili-
" ate, will fall upon our rear. France can be
" no object of jealousy to her for many years,
" either from its maritime power, or republican
" opinions. France must be for long weak and
" distressed. Russia can have nothing to dread
" from that quarter; and it would be infatua-
" tion in her to suffer France to be reduced too
" low in the scale, and England to be perched
" upon its ruins. The Empress has more rea-
" son to fear the ascendancy of England, than
" the democracy of France. It is of the British
" Court, which has bullied and insulted her,
" that she is naturally jealous. Be assured, if
" we fall upon France, Russia will watch us
" with vigilant suspicion. If we fail, she will
" secretly rejoice; if we succeed, she will hin-
" der us from reaping the benefits of our suc-
" cess.

" ceſs. Remember the armed neutrality.—
" And may not Spain adopt the ſame wary and
" politic ſyſtem? Has ſhe no wiſh to recover
" Gibraltar? No deſire to weaken our marine?
" No remembrance of Nootka Sound? Miniſ-
" ters will tell you confidently, that ſuch fears
" are groundleſs; that they receive continued
" aſſurances of friendſhip and alliance from
" theſe ſuſpected nations. Granted.—So did
" our Miniſters from all the powers of Europe
" at the beginning of the American war; and
" yet, before the concluſion of it, inſtead of be-
" ing aſſiſted by theſe friendly neighbours, we
" were ſucceſſively attacked by France, Spain,
" and Holland, and were only ſaved from the
" additional calamity of a Ruſſian war by our
" inability to continue the conteſt. The Euro-
" pean powers ever have been, and ever will
" be, jealous of Great-Britain; it is their in-
" tereſt to reduce her to a certain level; can
" we blame them for purſuing it? It is there-
" fore the intereſt of England to preſerve
" peace. Peace is the only means of pre-
" ſerving her power."

Such, perhaps, might be the ſentiments of a plain, honeſt, reflecting Engliſhman, who was duly ſenſible of the horrors of war, and had

had well conſidered the *real dangers*, not the *fictitious alarms*, that at preſent ſurround us.

Let us now caſt a look towards our reſources and allies, the temper of the nation, and the benefits of ſucceſs. Of the national proſperity at preſent, every perſon muſt think ſo well as to wiſh that it ſhould not be raſhly interrupted. But this vaunted proſperity is owing to our commerce, which a war would ſuſpend. Our poſt duties, and our general revenues, would therefore fall ſhort at the very time when the expenditure was encreaſed; extraordinary expences will require an extraordinary taxation. Who will ſay it is ſafe to oppreſs the people in their preſent temper, by ſtill heavier exactions? Who will perſiſt in holding forth our *great reſources* as an encouragement to war? Becauſe we are growing rich and happy, we muſt forſooth follow Miniſtry to a war, and be made poor and miſerable.—A modeſt argument truly, to a people groaning under a war-debt of two hundred and fifty millions! As to our allies, in caſe of a war, I am at a loſs to find them. Lord Macartney has not completed his deſtined voyage; we cannot, therefore, count, as yet, upon the

Emperor

Emperor of China! And, perhaps, as that worthy potentate lives upon the other ſide of the globe, diſtance may be ſome obſtacle to his wiſhes to join in European intrigue. *India*, however, may furniſh us with hopeful ſubſidiaries; and who knows but the wary Secretary of State may have freighted the ſpring ſhips with large bodies of the *Nizam's horſe*, ſo diſtinguiſhed in ſome late diſpatches? What Europe cannot ſupply, muſt be ſought for in Aſia. Germany has loſt its trade in blood. This is one of the ſhocking conſequences of the French revolution. That trade muſt be taught to flow *in* freſh channels.—Let us follow the Right Honourable Preſident. In India we ſhall ſtill find a Prince of Heſſe, who will ſell, without a bluſh, the lives of his ſubjects for a *juſt* and *honourable equivalent!*

" But why regret the want of allies? Our " own unanimity is the beſt alliance. Are we " not all combining, aſſociating, addreſſing? Is " not the Cabinet unanimous? Is not the " Houſe of Lords unanimous? Are not the " Commons almoſt unanimous? Has not even " the *virtuous* Lord Loughborough joined Ad- " miniſtration? Are not all people who poſſeſs " either titles, power, or property, unanimous

" upon

"upon the preſent occaſion? A war is there-
"fore certainly juſt, and muſt be ſucceſsful."

I grant that the majority of rank and fortune ſeem, for certain purpoſes, inclined to a war. This was preciſely the caſe at the beginning of the American conteſt. Nothing could then exceed the zeal of the nobles, clergy, army, navy, and country gentlemen: Never was a nation half ſo loyal, or half ſo wiſe. They were all enthuſiaſm; the leaſt oppoſition kindled them into flame. Nothing was then heard but their confidence of ſucceſs, the juſtice of their cauſe, the cowardice of the rebels abroad, the villainy of traitors at home, the vaſt inexhauſtible reſources of American taxation! They aſſociated, they addreſſed; on their knees they offered their lives and fortunes, made proteſtations of inviolable attachment to prerogative, and vows of eternal adherence to the juſt and politic meaſures of the Court! *Pudet hæc opprobia.*—After having ſeen the diſgraceful concluſion of that moſt ſolemn farce, we cannot, I think, in caution, place much reliance upon the fervor of the preſent moment. Enthuſiaſm is a tranſitory paſſion: It is, in moſt caſes, the effect of art upon ignorance. Plain ſenſe is dazzled for a while, but the eclipſe cannot laſt long: Truth alone affords a ſteady,

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permanent principle of action: It is uniform in operation; and, however ſlow, is certain in its effects.

The alarm of to-day, which rouſes our terrors by impoſing upon our credulity, to-morrow is regarded as a ſhocking prodigy; and in a little time, as examination ſucceeds, becomes the fated object of our alternate ridicule and contempt.

When declaimers take upon them to aſſert that the nation is unanimous, they ſhould at leaſt condeſcend to enquire what are the ſentiments of the moſt numerous claſſes of mankind. They are as much concerned in the progreſs and events of a war as any ariſtocratic confederacy. They are expoſed not only to be taxed in their property, but to be violated in their perſons. Have theſe valuable and induſtrious members of ſociety no capacities of deciſion, no right of judgment? Are they to be denied even the privilege of opinion, upon meaſures which may involve them in laſting afflictions? Is every offer of advice to the people to be deemed ſeditious and inflammatory? Are they never to be complimented with a lawful freedom of enquiry, or with the ſalutary language of truth?

We are perpetually ſtunned with the unanimity of the nation, the cordiality of all ranks and deſcriptions of men, their honeſt ardor for a war with France: Where do theſe gentlemen find this boaſted unanimity? Amidſt the riots and inſurrections mentioned in their favorite proclamation? Have they conſulted the nine-tenths of the nation upon the queſtion they ſo peremptorily decide? Are the ſailors unanimous for a war? Are the labouring poor unanimous? Are the perſons employed in your mines and manufactures, are the inferior tradeſmen, are the honeſt farmers, unanimous? Have any of theſe men voluntarily formed aſſociations, or entered into any pledges, tacit or expreſſed, for the ſupport of ſuch a meaſure, before they poſſeſs proofs of its neceſſity? Theſe are queſtions of diſcreet and politic caution; they well deſerve the conſideration of a wiſe Miniſtry.

It will be ſaid, theſe queſtions are ſeditious; that they are addreſſed to perſons who are groſsly ignorant, and who have no right to form any opinion on the ſubject. The charge is falſe and malicious, and an inſulting libel upon the majority of mankind. Confuſion to that arbitrary and inquiſitorial principle, the

ſecluſive, unſocial, ariſtocratic ſpirit of a little wealth and a little power, which makes us falſely imagine it our intereſt to keep the lower ranks in ignorance of their rights, and to regard every poor man as our *natural foe!*

If this horrible meaſure of a war be agreed upon, it behoves us to conſider whether we can gain by the conteſt. What ſolid uſe can we derive from another iſland in the Weſt, or another fortreſs in the Eaſt, Indies? It may encreaſe the number of our ſlaves, and the expences of protection. What recompence can we expect from another glorious deſcent upon Rochfort, or an expedition to St Maloes? What indemnification from the ruined finances of France? Shall we aſſiſt the fruitleſs cruſade, to replace the royal ſtandard upon the walls of Paris, and forget that, by a reverſe of fortune, our enemies may plant the tree of liberty in the faireſt part of our dominions? Are we not then running into a war with a certainty of loſs? The meaſure cannot be defended even upon this pagan principle of plunder, avarice, and revenge.

Let us now coolly conſider the oppoſite ſide of the queſtion, and enquire whether, amidſt the poſſible conſequences of a war, there are not

ſome which muſt rouſe the moſt confident, and alarm the moſt ſecure.

To ſay nothing of the diſcontents which are reported to prevail in Scotland, nor of the delicate ſtate of affairs in a ſiſter kingdom; to ſay nothing of the damage our trade and our coaſts may ſuffer from the innumerable privateers which France has it in her power to ſend forth, nor of the deſultory ravages of deſperate invaders; let me ſolemnly aſk whether the moſt decided victory can amply compenſate for other evils, which may probably ariſe at the *concluſion* of a war?

The evils I allude to are thoſe which may reſult from a diſbanded army, and a numerous body of ſailors, turned looſe without employment. If the army is not to be diſbanded, the evil is ſo much the worſe, and I have gained a ſtronger ground of objection. But if theſe multitudes of men are to be ſuddenly diſperſed without ſome permanent proviſion, without the power of regaining their former ſtations in ſociety, their morals corrupted, their health impaired, their hopes defeated, their habits of induſtry broken, their ſkill in their ancient occupations diminiſhed by diſuſe; is not a true friend to the peace and proſperity of this country warranted in the apprehenhenſion that many of them may

turn

turn out bad citizens from the neceſſity of their caſe, and may become the active, though miſguided, inſtruments of thoſe (if any ſuch there be) who ſeek the ruin of the Britiſh Conſtitution?

Again, there can be no doubt that France will treat Engliſh priſoners that fall into her hands with ſtudied lenity and kindneſs. She will do this from motives of obvious policy and intereſt. She will make it her buſineſs to inſtruct theſe men in thoſe very ideas of liberty, which are the dread and abhorrence of their government at home. Every priſon in France will thus become a ſchool of republicaniſm! An inſtitution to propagate the doctrines of her boaſted revolution! And is it impoſſible that the loyalty of our brave countrymen may be perverted by her arts, her entreaties, her careſſes, and ſeducements? Is there no danger to be apprehended from the return of men infected with her enthuſiaſm, and inſtructed in her principles?

Whoever is a diſcreet admirer of the triple form of the Engliſh Conſtitution, will haſten to avert the remoteſt chance of ſuch diſaſters, and will rather prefer, by inſtructions, by kindneſs, by a continued peace, to retain theſe perſons good citizens at home, than expoſe them to the

the hazard of being taught new rights, new politics, new notions of liberty, in the republican priſons of France.

Thoſe, therefore, who conſcientiouſly deteſt the novel principles of French freedom, to act conſiſtently, muſt oppoſe a meaſure which, in its ultimate effects, will give theſe principles a more extended circulation. A war will, for the period it laſts, cut off all free communication between the two countries, but at the reſtoration of peace, (and peace muſt at one time or other be reſtored) an importation of doctrines will aſſuredly take place, which aſſertors of monarchical government will in vain try to prevent, however they may regard it with abhorrence.

That the evils here apprehended are not without foundation, and that the jealouſy here recommended is not without example, may be collected from the late conduct of the deſpotic powers combined againſt France.

Such is their horror of the popularity of French principles, and the power which they poſſeſs of ſeducing the lower and oppreſſed claſſes of mankind, that they will not even allow a Frenchman upon any pretence to enter their territories. They purſue this caution at the

expence

expence of their humanity; and while with the blood and treaſure of their own ſubjects they are benevolently ſtriving to reinſtate the depoſed monarch on his throne, they will not afford his loyal, fugitive, and diſtreſſed ſubjects the meaneſt aſylum through the whole extent of their dominions!

But their caution is too late; the miſchief is in circulation. The imprudent attempt of the Courts of Vienna and Berlin, to deſtroy the new government of France, has eſtabliſhed her democracy on firmer grounds, and has opened a channel through which her principles will ultimately ſpread to the remoteſt bounds of the European continent. Germany muſt be the firſt to feel theſe effects: Germany, exhauſted by a bloody war, oppreſſed by accumulated taxes, and infected by thoſe who will return from confinement in France, will ſoon probably become a mournful prey to domeſtic diſcontents and inteſtine convulſion.

The approaching fate of this populous country after the French war, and the caſe of France after her campaigns in America, deſerve our moſt ſerious conſideration. *The criſis is awful! the leſſon moſt inſtructive!*

Thus,

Thus, for the benefit and inſtruction of my fellow-countrymen, I have thrown together ſome ſeaſonable hints upon the wickedneſs and miſery of war in general, and upon the impolicy of a French war in particular. I have pointed out the probability that Holland will be, in conſequence of it, over-run by the arms of France, its preſent conſtitution overthrown, and that we may be hereafter attacked by Ruſſia and by Spain, while we have no allies on whoſe aſſiſtance we can depend. The whole of this will then have happened in conſequence of a raſh conteſt; the pretext of which is doubtful, the object myſterious, the advantage equivocal, and the neceſſity unexplained.

If ancient Rome was uſed to decree a crown to that man who had ſaved the life of a ſingle citizen, Britain will not refuſe her approbation to him who labours by even theſe ſhort arguments to ſave the *lives of thouſands*. He writes with prejudices, it is true: His prejudices are ſtrong for peace. *Peace is the poor man's friend.* It is the only honourable patroneſs of wealth, of knowledge, of happineſs, and of freedom.

If, however, a war be unavoidable; if every expedient has been tried that ought to be tried, for the prevention of this horrible calamity;

calamity; if our enemies have refuſed to negociate, and menace us with inſtant and unprovoked hoſtilities; then, ſacrificing every political opinion, renouncing every private difference, let us cordially join in vigorous preparations for a ſucceſsful campaign.

But if our Miniſters have driven us into this moſt unparalleled and dangerous criſis, by their wilfulneſs, their pride, their neglect; by a criminal deſire of preventing reform in England, and eſtabliſhing deſpotiſm in France: If they have inſiſted upon demands in which France could not juſtly acquieſce; if they have inſulted her for refuſing to grant what they had no right to require; if, laſtly, they have diſdained to negociate, when ſhe has offered to explain; then in ſuch a caſe, and under ſuch circumſtances, unanimity for a war cannot be expected, nor ought to be deſired.

Of a war commenced contrary to reaſon, contrary to juſtice, we cannot calculate the calamity, nor anticipate the diſgrace. The evils of ſuch a war it is our duty to attempt to ſhorten, if we cannot altogether prevent. Should an unjuſt, impolitic, and ruinous conteſt be commenced, we have ſtill left conſtitutional means of complaint. No confidence in Miniſtry, no

treaſury favors, no political connections, no indiſcreet pledges, no external regards, ought to ſuppreſs our patriotiſm, or to ſuperſede that ſuperior and paramount duty, of attempting to bring to a ſpeedy concluſion, by every lawful means, the miſeries of an abſurd, deſtructive, and abominable war.

To conclude.—If Miniſters give us no explanations upon the ſubject, or explanations that are calculated to miſlead, not to convince; it becomes our duty, as citizens of a flouriſhing community, as members of a chriſtian church, to recur to thoſe means of remonſtrance and redreſs, with which the Conſtitution has inveſted the meaneſt of its ſubjects.

January 4th, 1793.

APPEN-

APPENDIX.

NOTE 1.—[*See p.* 6.]

I CANNOT reſiſt the pleaſure of laying before my readers the ſentiments, upon this ſubject, of one who is a diſtinguiſhed member of our eccleſiaſtical eſtabliſhment, and a moſt zealous and eloquent diſciple of Him who is emphatically ſtyled the *Prince of Peace*.

I muſt, however, in juſtice to the author, make two obſervations; firſt—that the paſſage is ſelected, not from a political ſermon, but from a controverſial pamphlet; and, ſecondly, that the writer is by no means a blind and indiſcriminate admirer of the French Revolution.

" After all the intrigues of politics, all the devaſtations of war, and all the barbarous exceſſes of deſpotiſm, which diſgrace the annals of mankind, the black and lowering ſtorm which threatens ſoon to overſpread the face of all Eu-

rope, and to overwhelm in one common ruin every looſe remnant and every faint veſtige of liberty, conſtitutes a ſpectacle equally new and tremendous.

"Even the tenets of Mr Paine himſelf are yet leſs novel in theory, and yet leſs pernicious in practice, than the counſels of thoſe ſanguinary fanatics, who would unbluſhingly and unfeelingly rouſe the unſparing ſword of foreign potentates, and point it, without provocation, without precedent, without any other plea than will, without any other end than tyranny, againſt the boſoms of Frenchmen contending with Frenchmen alone, upon French ground alone, about French rights, French laws, and French government alone.

"When it is urged, that princes, from their relation to princes, have a common cauſe, and a cauſe too, it is *meant* virtually paramount to rights of ſubjects and of men, the obvious anſwer is, that they who are *not* princes have alſo a common cauſe, and the obvious conſequence of that anſwer is, that if they are true to themſelves, to their neighbours, and to their poſterity, confederacy is to riſe up againſt confederacy, and deluge the world with blood.

"If indeed the threatened cruſade of ruffian

deſpots

deſpots ſhould be attempted, it will, in my opinion, be an outrageous infringement upon the laws of nations; it will be a ſavage conſpiracy againſt the written and the unwritten rights of mankind; and, *therefore*, in the ſincerity of my ſoul, I pray the righteous Governor of the Univerſe, the Creator of men, and the King of kings, I pray HIM to abate the pride, to aſſuage the malice, and to confound all the devices, of ALL the parties, directly or indirectly leagued in this complicated ſcene of guilt and horror! This inſult upon the dignity of human nature itſelf! This treaſon againſt the majeſty of God's own image, rational and immortal man.

" As to myſelf, and to others, who, like myſelf, expreſs the terror and juſt abhorrence which they feel at this moſt unparalleled meaſure, when we are ſcornfully aſked, why we expreſs thoſe feelings, we ſhall find our anſwer in Mr Burke's philanthropy oppoſed to Mr Burke's politics; (p. 9, of his Appeal.) " Is it inhuman to prevent, if poſſible, the ſpilling of Frenchmen's blood, or imprudent to guard againſt the effuſion of our own," and in a cauſe, I will add, which, while Engliſhmen are Engliſhmen, never can be our own? For is it poſſible, that by the intrigues of courts, by the ſophiſtry

of

of miniſters, or by the futile and hollow pleas of a guaranty in one place, and of alliance in another, the free-born deſcendants of free-born fathers can be perſuaded to endure one tax, to unſheath one ſword, to fall in with one meaſure, in oppoſition to the precious and ſacred intereſts of general liberty?

"Unleſs our conſtitution be, as dying Brutus ſaid of virtue, "an empty name," by the very ſpirit of that conſtitution, and by the force of a compact, more ſolemn and more binding than the ties of any treaty, woven in any cabinet; Britons eminently are, what the Athenians profeſſed to be, the guarantees of freedom itſelf, and the allies of all free men, throughout all the world.

> And, when they frown, it is againſt th' oppreſſor,
> And not againſt the French.
>
> SHAK. RICH. II.

"The people of England, I am ſure, then, are too gallant to engage in a war againſt ſuch a nation, in ſuch circumſtances. The parliament of England is too enlightened to approve of a war. The king of England is far too wiſe, too humane, too magnanimous, to propoſe a war."

[*And*

Note 2. [*See p.* 13.]

[*And may not Spain adopt the ſame wary and politic ſyſtem?*] That our fears from this quarter are not without juſt foundation, may be proved from the laſt accounts received of the conduct of Spain towards France. At the very time when the miniſtry of England, the bullies of Europe, the mean retractors of their unexecuted threats, have refuſed to negociate with the freely choſen repreſentatives of the French nation, whom they ſtigmatize with every foul term of deteſtation and reproach, the haughty and high-ſpirited Spaniard condeſcends to *ſtudy* the *intereſts* of his country, openly enters into negociation, concludes a treaty, and expreſſes the ſtrongeſt deſire of a cloſer alliance with this ſame abhorred and deteſted Convention, at the very moment they are engaged upon the trial of a prince, who is his near relation and his ancient ally!

If either Ruſſia or Spain had thought it their intereſt to ſupport the confederacy againſt France, their quota would have been furniſhed, and their efforts applied, early in the laſt ſummer. A powerful combined fleet to intercept her trade, to cut off her reſources, and to diſable her marine, with a vigorous and well-conducted diverſion from the Spaniſh frontiers (if ſuch a meaſure

meaſure was practicable) at the inſtant when the diſciplined hordes of Germany were pouring in upon her eaſtern borders, might have inſpired the French nation with a ſudden terror, which without much bloodſhed would probably for a while have reſtored the ſplendor, dignity, and oppreſſive abuſes of the depoſed government.

Was this forbearance of Spain the reſult of impolicy, or apprehenſion? If of the former, is it probable that after having loſt ſo favourable an opportunity, ſhe will chuſe a ſeaſon leſs hopeful and auſpicious?

It is manifeſt therefore from this pacific conduct during the ſummer, (and it is more ſtrongly illuſtrated by her late declaration) that ſhe thinks her true unerring policy to be peace with France, and that from a French war ſhe has every thing to loſe, nothing to gain.

A war carried on againſt her by the French Republic, would be a war not againſt the Spaniſh people, but againſt the abſolute monarchy of Spain.

Fear is the principle of deſpotic governments. An invaſion from France might with eaſe ſubvert a ſtructure built upon ſo precarious a foundation. A French army, by affording a rendezvous to the diſcontented, and a protection to the

people

people from the tyranny of their oppreſſors, would deſtroy the very principle upon which that government ſubſiſts. Beſides it is notorious that Spain abounds with indigent and unemployed multitudes, who, deſtitute of that affection for the ſtate which liberty and property ever produce, would with alacrity join the ſtandard of revolt.

I cannot forbear quoting a few expreſſions from the late declaration of the Spaniſh Chargè des Affaires to the National Convention.—He ſays, "I hope the *executive council*, the *whole* "*French nation*, and *the repreſentatives of the* "*nation*, will ſee in them new and authentic "proofs of the frankneſs and *amicable intentions* "of his Catholic Majeſty," &c. Again, "by the "very *difference* of the two governments, and the "*preſent* ſituation of the two empires, it is *clearly* "*evident* that the French troops might be aſſem- "bled in much greater *numbers*, and with much "greater *promptitude*, than the Spaniſh troops "could be on the frontiers of Spain; and thus "mutual ſincerity, frankneſs, and amity can "alone give any *parity* to this meaſure." He concludes with theſe remarkable expreſſions: "All that I have now expreſſed to you is the wiſh of

"of the King—it is the *wiſh* of the *Spaniſh* "*nation*, of that *nation*," &c. &c.

Thus we find a treaty is actually formed, by which France will be enabled to employ a great additional number of troops, either in Germany or in the defence of her eaſtern frontiers: nor is this all; a cloſe and permanent alliance is anxiouſly *ſolicited* by the miniſters of Spain.—Had our miniſtry no knowledge of theſe intentions of the Spaniſh court? Are they determined to ruſh into a war with France, at the very moment ſhe has compleated an alliance with the court of Madrid? Why was not our late envoy at Coblentz, "of virtuous father, virtuous ſon," the pure poſſeſſor of hereditary patriotiſm, and the ſolemn adjuſter of the European balance, diſpatched with full powers to corrupt the virtuous diſpoſitions of the Spaniſh miniſter? Were dangers apprehended of an unpopular reception? Was it feared that a high-ſpirited grandee might regard ſuch overtures as inſults, and reply in a ſtrain at once of ſuſpicion and contempt.

"*Nam quis te* juvenum confidentiſſime *noſtras* "*juſſit adire domos?*"

To the *poſſible* conſequences of a war, accident and defeat, and to the *probable* ones, an attack

attack from the Courts of Peterſburgh and Madrid, may be added others, which, by many ſerious, well-informed men, are conſidered as *certain*.

" America," ſay they, " will take no part in " the ſtruggle. The form of her Government, " the virtuous wiſdom of her Councils, and the " commercial character to which ſhe aſpires, " will equally bind her to a ſtrict neutrality. " Her ports look out upon the track of our Weſt- " India trade, and her coaſts afford every oppor- " tunity that can be deſired by thoſe to whom " the deſtruction of that trade is an object. " There can be no doubt, therefore, but that " privateers, under French colours, will ſwarm " in her harbours immediately upon the com- " mencement of a war. An expenſive arma- " ment will be neceſſary in thoſe ſeas, to defend " our territorial poſſeſſions; but what fleet will " be ſufficient to protect our commerce from " the innumerable and widely-ſcattered ſhips of " adventure, which will enjoy ſuch unparalleled " advantages from the peculiar ſituation of the " American coaſt? The benefits which America " will derive from theſe circumſtances are ob- " vious; and it is equally obvious, from the " declining ſtate of the French Weſt-India

"trade, that England will ſuffer without a "chance of retaliation."

For the ſatisfaction of thoſe who are likely to amuſe themſelves by ſupporting a war abroad, and by perpetuating abuſes at home, I ſubjoin an account of the progreſs of the national debt, from the year 1739, to the year 1786.

	Capital.	Intereſt.
Before the war in 1740, the debt was	46,382,650 —	1,903,961
In 1749, after the war,	78,166,906 —	2,765,608
Encreaſed by nine years of war,	31,784,256 —	861,747
Diminiſhed by eight years of peace,	3,089,641 —	111,590
Amount at the beginning of the war in the year 1755,	75,077,264 —	2,654,018
At the end of the war in 1763,	146,582,844 —	4,840,822
Encreaſed by eight years of war,	71,505,580 —	2,186,803
Reduced by twelve years of peace,	10,639,793 —	400,000
Amount in 1775,	135,943,051 —	4,440,821
Amount in 1786, three years after the concluſion of the American war,	266,725,097 —	9,536,026
Encreaſed by the American war,	130,782,046 —	5,095,205

Thus, by the fatal ſyſtem of continental wars, carried on under the ſpecious pretext of preſerving the balance of power, and by an enormous expenditure during the intervals of peace, England, in half a century, became burthened with a national debt of one hundred and forty-ſix millions! A twelve years peace, by a comparatively ſlow progreſs, effected a reduction of ten millions from that oppreſſive load. And had our Miniſters adopted and perſevered in a plan of peace, economy,

economy, and retrenchment; had they made it their object to encourage enterprize, to promote manufactures, and to extend the commerce of a daring, indefatigable people, in eighteen years, from 1775 to the preſent time, the greater part of the remaining debt might certainly have been liquidated, our taxes would ſcarcely have been felt, our population would have rapidly encreaſed, and a more equal portion of wealth and contentment would have been diſtributed amidſt the lower claſſes of the community.

But we were not content to effect the reduction of this evil by ordinary means, when the taxation of America opened ſo inviting a ſcene to our avarice and ambition.

" *Conceſſa pudet ire via, civemque videis.*"

The nation was duped by deluſive promiſes, and rouſed into a frenzy of enthuſiaſm; a war was entered into by general conſent; and from the above ſtatement it appears, that the capital of our debt was almoſt doubled, and the intereſt of it encreaſed to more than twice the ſum it was at the commencement of that ruinous and deteſtable meaſure!

As a friend to the principles of our Engliſh Monarchy, and to a judicious correction of abuſes,

abuſes, I cannot better conclude, than by the following ſerious queſtion: "Should a French war raiſe our debt to three hundred millions, what effects may this produce upon the temper of the nation, and upon the queſtion of reform?"

FINIS.

ERRATA.

Page 3, *line* 8, *after the word* violence, *add* and.
4, *line* 21, *for* face, *read* force.
7, *line* 9, *for* forty, *read* thirty.
14, *line* 11, *for* poſt, *read* port.
16, *line* 21, *for* opprobia, *read* opprobria.